Nine-Layer Media Manipulation Strategy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) ｜中共宣传的九层媒体操控策略

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This  describes the strategies used by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to control and guide information dissemination and public opinion through various layers of media:

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First Layer (Domestic Media): Surface information disseminated to the general public through national media such as "People's Daily," "Xinhua News Agency," and "CCTV News," promoting basic slogans, directions, and policy stances.

Second Layer (Domestic Media): Surface information aimed at specific interest groups and individuals of particular status, conveying political attitudes and signals.

Third Layer (Domestic Media): Official interpretation of information, using outlets like "Global Times," Phoenix Television, Sohu, NetEase, and Baidu Headlines to guide further thoughts and behaviors of the public interested in first-layer information.

Fourth Layer (Domestic Media): Secondary processing of information, disseminating content to different age groups who may not be interested in or sensitive to surface information, using platforms such as Weibo, WeChat, TikTok, Kuaishou, and Bilibili. This includes entertainment information, subtly influencing subconscious thoughts.

Fifth Layer (Domestic Media): Tertiary processing of information, using platforms like Weibo, Bilibili, and Douban to create topics, both positive and negative, and influence daily thinking and judgment through coordinated messaging, comments, and narrative shaping.

Sixth Layer (Domestic Media): Reverse guidance of information in times of information crisis or credibility issues, diverting attention from the crisis by creating fake leaks or distractions, using tactics such as scapegoating, sacrificing minor issues to protect major ones, and even self-criticism to construct a heroic narrative.

Seventh Layer (Foreign Media): Positive guidance of information, creating internationalized messages through overseas media outlets or experts to further influence the ideology of the overseas public or those crossing the digital borders.

Eighth Layer (Foreign Media): Reverse guidance of information through platforms like YouTube, Twitter, and outlets associated with dissident movements, presenting three parts truth and seven parts falsehood. This includes attacking its propaganda system, using low-level black humor, mockery, and extreme content to gradually incite dislike among the public, eventually leading them to distrust these foreign media.

Ninth Layer (Foreign Media): Enhanced reverse guidance through platforms like YouTube and Twitter, crafting an image of objective and rational media, presenting seven parts truth and three parts falsehood. Generally avoiding certain discussions, maintaining an image of objectivity and neutrality, releasing credible information that is not available domestically, but during critical events, guiding public opinion and diverting attention to mislead the public.

Note: The above refers to identifiable information creators or those whose creators can be traced back. However, a significant portion of daily decision-making by the public might still be influenced by uncontrollable information sources, such as "I've heard," "my friend said," or "someone said." This type of decision-making behavior is very useful for the Chinese Communist Party.

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Note: The above refers to identifiable information creators or those who can be traced back through various means. However, many everyday decisions made by the general public likely come from uncontrollable sources of rumor, such as "I heard," "my classmate said," or "someone said." Such decision-making behaviors are particularly useful for the Chinese Communist Party.

 

 

中共宣传的九层次信息操作策略来控制和引导公众舆论的方式

Screenshot shared by netizens 网友截图 

 

1. 第一层（国内媒体）：表层信息，通过《人民日报》、《新华社》、新闻联播等全国媒体向普通民众传播的基本口号、方向、政策站队。
2. 第二层（国内媒体）：表层信息，针对特定的利益团体和特定身份的人群传递政治态度与政治讯号。
3. 第三层（国内媒体）：信息的官方解读，通过《环球时报》、凤凰卫视、搜狐、网易、百度头条等对第一层信息感兴趣的民众进行进一步的思想引导与行为引导。
4. 第四层（国内媒体）：信息的二次加工，通过微博、微信、抖音、快手、B站等平台中对表层信息不感兴趣或不敏感的不同年龄层制播放信息，包括娱乐信息，进行日常潜意识引导。
5. 第五层（国内媒体）：信息的三次加工，通过微博、B站、豆瓣等强调复型平台，平时经营制造话题，有正面有负面，连同特定的人海战术刷屏、回帖、带节奏，影响观众的日常的思维判断。
6. 第六层（国内媒体）：信息的反向引导，在信息失控或公信力危机爆发时，通过伪装成个体爆料的形式转移危机关注点，含卒保车，寻找替锅对象，制造爆料，引媒替间争办对拗民衅骇惧得以狡，为避免核心问题，甚至不惜断臂自黑，塑造英雄，收割线成如约。
7. 第七层（境外媒体）：信息的正向引导，制造国际化包装的信息，以海外媒体的形象或海外专家学者的身份进行正向的宣传，使得境外的民众或各网络越境的民众进一步接受意识形态的影响。
8. 第八层（境外媒体）：信息的反向引导，通过油管、推特、〇〇功、海外民运塑造负面信息，三分真七分假，主攻攻击自己的宣传系统；刻意低级黑、恶搞、极端偏激暴虐的信息，引发网络越境的民众逐渐对其厌恶，逐渐排斥，最终将海外媒体视为不可信的宣传。
9. 第九层（境外媒体）：信息的反向引导加强，通过油管、推特塑造客观理性的媒体，七分真三分假，平时不涉某讨论，维持客观中立的分析，力刻意喧哗，有意放出部分墙内不可见的可信的真消息，但在关键的重大事件出现时，带风向，转移矛盾，有意误导民众。

注: 以上所指是指有明确信息制造者，或者通过手段可以反向追踪信息制造者。 然而大量日常民众的行为决策，很可能还来自于不可控信息源的耳语传播，比如“我听说”“我同学说”“有人说”，而这种行为决策，对于中国共产党来说是非常有用的。